Enforcement of Restrictions by Homeowners Associations: Balancing Individual Rights and Community Interests by Korngold, Gerald
digitalcommons.nyls.edu
Faculty Scholarship Articles & Chapters
1998
Enforcement of Restrictions by Homeowners
Associations: Balancing Individual Rights and
Community Interests
Gerald Korngold
New York Law School
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.nyls.edu/fac_articles_chapters
Part of the Land Use Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at DigitalCommons@NYLS. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Articles & Chapters by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@NYLS.
Recommended Citation
13 Colloqui: Cornell J. of Planning & Urban Issues 71 (1998)
I 
f 
I 
I 
i 
I 
• 
1 
I 
I 
I 
• 
,, 
Enforcement of Restrictions by 
Homeowners Associations 
Balancing Individual Rights and Community Interests 
Gerald Korngold 
Residential developments often create a general scheme of restrictions, operate common facilities, and estab-
lish an owners association to enforce the restrictions and operate the common areas. Private governments 
raise difficult public policy and legal issues. Private regimes should generally be enforced as they encourage 
the efficient use ofland, allow choice in living arrangements, and foster participatory democracy. At the same 
time, though, the restrictions can offend personal autonomy, create inefficiencies, and permit undue control 
by past generations over present owners. 
The law should therefore enforce homeowners association covenants that prevent harmful fallout on the 
neighborhood, but they should not uphold the few covenants that offend the personal autonomy of the current 
owner. Moreover, the law should require that community associations treat owners equally, employ fair proce-
dures, and refrain from making irrational decisions. 
0 ver the past thirty years, there has been a tre mendous growth in private communities. In 
these regimes, the owners are subject to a scheme 
ofrestrictions on land use and owner behavior. The 
restrictions are administered and enforced by an as-
sociation of the owners, which also has the power to 
set rules and regulations binding the properties. 
These associations function as private governments, 
and are not subject to the constitutional doctrine 
and statutory rules that limit and shape the actions 
of public government. 
These private land use controls and pri-
vate governments bring important benefits by 
promoting efficient land use, freedom of choice 
in living arrangements, and democratic self-
determination. They also, however, raise serious 
questions about the rights of the individual and the 
extent and nature of permissible regulation by the 
community. Courts often must resolve disputes be-
tween owners and the community over the substance 
of the restrictions and the decision-making process 
of the homeowners association. This article will cri-
tique the conflicting policies and suggest how the 
law should balance these competing interests. 
Gerald Korngold is Dean and the Everett D. and Eugenia S. McCurdy Professor of Law at Case Western 
Reserve University School of Law. He teaches and writes in the areas of property and real estate law. His 
books include Private Land Use Arrangements: Easements, Real Covenants, and Equitable Servitudes and 
Real Estate Transactions (with P. Goldstein). He has published articles in the Texas, Wisconsin, California-Davis, 
Fordham, and Nova law reviews and the Real Estate Law Journal. Professor Korngold is an adviser to the Restatement 
(Third) of Property-Servitudes published by the American Law Institute. 
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This inquiry can provide guidance to planners, 
developers, and lawyers in creating enforceable re-
strictions and structuring viable homeowners asso-
ciations. Private governments deserve the attention 
of public-sector planners and policy makers for a 
number of reasons. First, homeowners association 
developments may have an impact on the larger 
community outside of the development. For example, 
owners who are paying assessments to the associa-
tion for private services such as recreation and se-
curity may resist paying their fair share of the public 
tax burden necessary to provide parks and police 
protection for the larger community. A private gov-
ernment may in effect provide the means for own-
ers to secede from the larger body politic, thus 
hampering efforts to address general social prob-
lems. Moreover, homeowners associations are regu-
lated by government through condominium, 
common interest ownership, and planned unit de-
velopment legislation and through zoning and the 
subdivision process. Through these vehicles, plan-
ners and public officials may be able to influence 
the balance that is struck between the homeowners 
association's interest and the individual rights of 
the owners. Finally, private government and public 
government may learn from the experience of the 
other in dealing with conflicts between the will of 
the majority and the wishes of the dissenter. Both 
face similar issues, such as balancing architectural 
controls with free expression, occupancy restrictions 
with family privacy, and speedy remedial action by 
the community with due process considerations. 
Two recent items, from a long list, illustrate the 
tension between owners and private governments. 
The first example deals with a private subdivision 
that barred the use of the houses by "more than one 
family" (Feely v. Birenbaum 1977). Two unrelated 
men purchased a home in the subdivision as co-own-
ers. In an enforcement action brought by the 
homeowners association, the court held that 
the restriction was valid and that the term 
"family" did not include persons unrelated by 
blood or marriage. The court issued an order 
barring the two owners from residing together 
in the house. It is important to note that the case 
involved removal of an owner, not a rental tenant, 
from his home. One may wonder whether this case 
reached a proper balance between, on one hand, the 
values of the community and the majority, and, on 
the other hand, the individual's property rights and 
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personal autonomy. 
A second item involved a condominium 
owner (a 51 year old professional woman and 
grandmother) who was sent a notice from her 
condominium association as follows: "Descrip-
tion of violation: resident seen parking in cir-
cular driveway kissing and doing bad things 
for over one hour." The association threatened 
to impose a fine if it happened again. The 
notice was also posted publicly at the condo-
mmmm, employing public humiliation to 
achieve compliance with rules and regulations. 
The incident was covered in the local and na-
tional print and broadcast media. As things 
turned out, the association had made a mis-
take, and the notice was meant for a 1 7 year 
old woman and a 21 year old man who had 
been "parking" that evening. For that mistake, 
the condominium owner suffered public hu-
miliation and damage to her reputation at 
work; some of the nicer names she was called 
included "hot lips," "marathon kisser," and 
"the kissing bandit" (Dodson 1991; Lichtblau 
1991; Willman 1991). Again, certain questions 
emerge from this episode: Should associations 
be regulating such matters? Does the behav-
ior of the association in this case give us con-
fidence in the exercise of discretion by private 
governments and the process that they use? 
Where was the notice, opportunity to be heard, 
and neutral decision-making that we require 
as a legal matter from public government? 
Use of Private Land Controls 
Historical Roots 
Some historical background is necessary to as-
sess the desirability of private land use con-
trols. Private land use controls have long been 
employed to allocate non-possessory rights in 
the land of another. These interests have tra-
ditionally been referred to as "easements" and 
"covenants." An easement usually gives a land-
owner an affirmative right in another person's prop-
erty, such as the right to use a path or roadway. A 
covenant typically imposes a restriction on the use 
of a parcel of land, such as barring nonresidential 
uses; the holder of a covenant, usually a neighbor, 
thus has a veto power over the development of 
another's land (Korngold 1990). Recently, scholars 
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TABLE 1: Percentage of Community Associations Institute member associations 
(by unit size) that offer seven of the most common amenities: 
Number of Units or Homes 
Amenity ~ 50 51-150 151-350 351-500 501+ 
Pool 43% 64% 76% 74% 75% 
Playground 15% 27% 37% 42% 47% 
Park Area 20% 26% 29% 51% 52% 
Clubhouse 12% 37% 56% 61% 60% 
Tennis 13% 31% 45% 52% 58% 
Lake/Pond 13% 22% 30% 42% 42% 
Golf Course 1% 2% 4% 4% 19% 
Source: Community Associations Institute 1993, 20. 
have referred to easements and covenants collec-
tively as "servitudes." 
Private land use controls have long been recog-
nized, with examples dating from Roman and early 
English law. In the modern era, these rights have 
become even more important. The industrial revo-
lution brought a demand for railroad and canal 
rights-of-way and for rights over neighboring lands 
to exploit resources and to build efficient manufac-
turing operations. Perhaps as a direct result, restric-
tions became imperative to designate residential 
areas as havens from the industrial and commer-
cial world (French 1988). 
Modem Applications 
At the end of the twentieth century, private land 
use arrangements play an even more important role. 
Society faces a decreasing amount of usable land, 
urban and suburban sprawl testing transportation 
networks, increased interdependence of landowners 
due to geographical proximity, and environmental 
fallout due to poorly planned development of ear-
lier times. 'I'hus, over recent years, there has been 
an increased use of traditional easements, such as 
rights-of-way, pipeline and utility easements, and 
resource extraction rights. New easements have also 
been developed to meet commercial, social, and tech-
nological advances. These include telecommunica-
tions easements; solar and wind easements to 
prevent interruption of sources of alternative en-
ergy; conservation and historical easements that 
prevent degradation of natural areas or architec-
tural features; and beach access easements to allow 
the public to reach the seashore.1 
Servitudes are also being used today in a com-
prehensive manner. Easements and covenants are 
almost always used today in shopping centers and 
office and industrial parks in order to restrict the 
types of businesses, regulate the type and manner 
of construction, grant rights of access and use, and 
allocate expenses for commonly shared facilities 
such as roads and utilities. 
Community Associations 
Importantly, there has been an increasing use of 
private controls in the housing arena. Residential 
developers often employ servitudes in tract and high-
rise developments to increase the desirability of the 
housing units. Typically, the developer imposes re-
strictions on the use of the property and types of 
construction and structures. Often the owners re-
ceive rights in common facilities serving the devel-
opment, such as roads, utilities, and recreational 
areas, with a covenant providing for the payment of 
fees by the owners to operate the facilities. Table 1 
describes the amenities provided by community as-
sociations that are members of the Community As-
sociations Institute, a national, nonprofit 
association. 
Furthermore, an increasing number of 
these developments create an association of the unit 
owners. The association administers the servitudes 
through decisions of the entire body or a subgroup, 
and essentially functions as a private government 
pursuant to authority granted by the servitudes. The 
association usually operates, maintains, and some-
times owns the shared facilities. The association may 
also be empowered to set rules and regulations, en-
force violations (such as noise and pet rules), make 
discretionary decisions and approvals (such as ar-
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Figure 1: 
Types of Community Associations 
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Source: Corrm.mity Associations Institute 1993, 13. 
chitectural plans), provide other services (such as 
security and trash collection), and levy, collect, and 
disburse dues from the owners to pay for these ac-
tivities. These servitude regimes may be organized 
as a tract development with a homeowners associa-
tion, a condominium, or a cooperative; despite the 
differences in legal form, the policy considerations 
are the same, and legal results should be consis-
tent. 2 Figure 1 illustrates the comparative numbers 
of these three types of communal ownership. 
The growth in owner associations has been note-
worthy. In 1962, there were 500 associations (Com-
munity Associations Institute 1988, 7); in 1992, 
estimates put the number at 150,000 (Community 
Associations Institute 1993, 13). In 1970, only one 
percent of US housing units were in owner associa-
tions; 1993 figures show that 32 million Americans 
live in associations, equating to nearly one out of 
eight people (Community Associations Institute 
1993, 13). Table 2 describes the growth in housing 
units in community associations. 
Tensions in Community Associations 
Despite this great growth in owners associations, 
there are some warning signals that bear watching. 
News items and court decisions have reported con-
flicts within associations; these can be broken into 
certain rough categories: 
Disputes between the community and the 
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individual: Sometimes there is a conflict between 
the majority's goals and the individual's autonomy. 
Such disputes include association prohibitions of po-
litical signs and flags; the banning of outdoor 
swingsets; the prohibition of Christmas lights, stars 
of David, or a succah, a small, outdoor structure used 
to observe the Jewish holiday of Succot; a battle be-
tween an association and an owner who was using 
the community pool for baptisms; never ending dis-
putes over approval of architectural designs and 
construction materials; conflict over pet restrictions; 
and the family-type restriction described earlier.3 
Governance problems within the community 
association: In other situations the community as-
sociation decision-making process breaks down and 
something other than effective and fair, democratic 
self government is taking place. One recent case il-
lustrates some of the disorder that can result in pri-
vate governance. In this case, at the meeting of the 
owners of a New York City cooperative building, one 
owner publicly threatened to kill another, a preg-
nant woman, over a dispute about governance of the 
cooperative. As a further irony, when the threat-
ened owner brought a suit against the threatener 
claiming that the act amounted to an intentional 
infliction of emotional distress, the court dismissed 
the action. The court gave the surprising explana-
tion that the threat was not "extreme and outra-
geous conduct, which so transcends the bounds of 
decency as to be regarded as atrocious and intoler-
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able in a civilized society" (Owen v. Leventritt 1991, 
26). While this is certainly a unique story with an 
odd disposition of the legal claim, it does raise ques-
tions about the quality of discourse and governance 
in community associations and the acceptable so-
cial norms in such situations. 
Comprehensive challenges to the commu-
nity association structure: In some situations, 
the whole notion of private government is 
questioned. Consider current developments in 
Columbia, Maryland, which was founded over 27 
years ago as a planned community and is currently 
home to 80,000 people. The community association 
there owns and operates the city's open space and 
recreational areas. A group of dissident owners are 
engaged in a petition drive seeking a referendum to 
incorporate Columbia as a city and to end the pri-
vate government of the association. The dissidents 
claim that the Columbia Association is fiscally irre-
sponsible and that it provides only "symbolic democ-
racy," not "real democracy" (Sachs 1994a, 1994c). A 
leader of this group stated that "there had to be a 
way in which citizens have control over finances and 
policies. That's the purpose-Jeffersonian democ-
racy'' (Sachs 1994b). The defenders of the Columbia 
Association reject the dissenters' view. They believe 
that the association functions efficiently and openly, 
and that a city government would be more expen-
sive than the current association system. In their 
view, the private association structure is essential 
to achieve the Columbian vision of the good life. 
In determining how the law should react to the 
conflicts over servitudes and private residential gov-
ernments, it must be recognized that courts, in de-
ciding cases, choose between competing arguments 
of the litigants. Sometimes these choices are man-
dated by a clear, binding precedent of a prior deci-
sion, on which people have relied in planning their 
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actions. In other cases, though, the court is dealing 
with a legal question that has not been previously 
decided or that presents a new wrinkle. In the lat-
ter, the court must understand the public policies 
inherent in the dispute and select a rule that will 
best effectuate societal goals. Finding that public 
policy is not always easy, but choosing among com-
peting policy arguments is something that Anglo-
American common law decision-makers have done 
from the time the first wise man stood under a tree 
at the village green in medieval England and de-
cided a dispute between two people over ownership 
of a cow. It is thus imperative to understand the 
policy considerations inherent in servitudes and 
community association disputes. 
Policies Favoring Servitudes 
The enforcement of servitudes validates private con-
sensual arrangements, based on choices made in the 
marketplace. This enforcement is consistent with 
the law's long-standing respect for "freedom of con-
tract." There are several benefits from enforcement 
of these private arrangements, and these policies 
are reflected in various judicial decisions. 
Efficiency 
Servitudes permit the efficient allocation of limited 
land resources. By using servitudes, people can buy 
the specific rights in land that they want without 
having to spend more than they wish. For example, 
if A, the owner of Lot 1, wants to prevent the lot 
next door (Lot 2), owned by B, from having a factory 
built on it, A can buy a covenant from B, for, hypo-
thetically, $20. If A could not buy a covenant, he 
would have to spend $100, hypothetically, to pur-
chase the entire property interest (i.e. fee simple 
title) in Lot 2. That would be a waste of A's resources 
TABLE 2: Number of Community Association Housing Units 
1970 1975 1990 
Total CA Units 701,000 2,031,439 11,638,921 
Total Associations 10,000 20,000 130,000 
Total Number of 
Housing Units 63,445,192 67,640,000 102,263,678 
CAs Percent of All Housing 1.11% 3.0% 11.38% 
Source: Community Associations Institute 1993, 13. 
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that could be better put to another use. In addition, 
Lot 2 would be unavailable to another person who 
would have been happy to buy it for nonindustrial 
uses. 
Moreover, community association servi-
tudes bring extra efficiencies beyond tradi-
tional servitudes. Community association servitudes 
provide common facilities (such as utilities and rec-
reation areas) that individual owners could not af-
ford. Developer costs can also be lowered due to 
planned unit development (PUD) zoning, and the 
developer can avoid the expenses necessary to meet 
governmental dedication standards if common fa-
cilities are retained and administered by the com-
munity association (United States Advisory 
Commission 1989, 4). These savings can be passed 
on to the homeowners. 
Judicial decisions recognize that people will not 
enter into such efficiency-maximizing arrangements 
if the law will not enforce them. As one court stated, 
''Those individuals who have invested their life sav-
ings in a home, 'The American Dream,' are entitled 
to protection under the law, including enforcement 
of the covenant, which they relied on when invest-
ing in the area" (Kiernan v. Snowden 1953). 
Moral Obligation 
The law has also enforced private land use controls 
on moral grounds, finding that people are morally 
obligated to live up to their promises. It would not 
be proper to allow a person to buy land for a re-
duced price because of the presence of a covenant 
and then resell it for a higher price free of the cov-
enant (Tulk v. Moxhay 1848). For example, one court 
enforced an adults-only restriction in a condo-
minium, barring the unit owners-a married 
couple-from living there with their newborn 
baby. The court stated: "All young couples 
buying living units can foresee the possibility 
of children and this restriction has not 'snuck' up 
on them, for they well knew of it prior to purchase 
or conception. The choice was theirs"4 (Franklin v. 
White Egret Condominium 1977). 
Freedom of Choice 
The courts also enforce covenants because they rep-
resent the voluntary choices of people. Servitudes 
allow individuals to create an environment that they 
believe will maximize their self-fulfillment. In an 
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era of diminishing resources and increasing pres-
sures of daily life, it is important to allow people to 
create their own home and community environ-
ments, as places ofrenewal. In exchange for happi-
ness and peace of mind from the servitude regime, 
the owners accept community restrictions and 
power. One noncomplying owner should not be al-
lowed to unilaterally destroy the free choice and 
quality of life of the rest of the community. Thus, 
one court recognized the role of the association to 
"promote the health, happiness, and peace of mind 
of the majority of the unit owners" (Hidden Harbour 
Estates, Inc. v. Norman 1980). 
Community Associations 
Moreover, the law has recognized that there are 
special benefits in having a system ofreciprocal ser-
vitudes administered and enforced by a community 
association. Covenants are "reciprocal" when all lots 
have the same restrictions on them, giving each 
owner the same burdens and benefits. With recip-
rocal covenants, neighbors may be more willing to 
compromise when there are conflicts or questions 
about covenant enforcement because of the social 
norms favoring neighborly cooperation. Also, there 
is self-interest-an owner may compromise on an 
enforcement question today since in the future the 
owner herself may seek an accommodation from her 
neighbor. 
Furthermore, flexibility is increased if the 
covenants can be amended or modified by the 
consent of less than 100 percent of the own-
ers. Holdouts are thus prevented, and the com-
munity can achieve necessary change without 
making ''blackmail payments." An association can 
also be given, in the original documents creating the 
development, the right to exercise discretion. This 
is beneficial since some issues cannot be determined 
at the time the community is created, such as the 
amount of dues necessary to run the common facili-
ties ten years into the development. 
Moreover, the association structure permits 
democratic self-determination. The owners are em-
powered to participate in the decisions affecting lo-
cal land policy and to vote on community directions. 
One commentator observed about public land use 
regulation: ''Local governments are the last direct 
contact that the average citizen has with the idea of 
government; it is the only place where the citizen 
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still feels that his individual participation might 
make a difference" (Krasnowiecki 1980, 722). 
These words resonate loudly in light of current 
thoughts about devolution of governmental control, 
which tend to advocate a transfer of political power 
from larger entities to local groups. Moreover, there 
are echoes of the message of the communitarians, 
with their focus on an increased sense of commu-
nity and individual responsibility. 
Problems with Servitudes 
Although there are great benefits from servitudes 
and community associations, these must be balanced 
against the costs. There are two problem areas: the 
first involves the permissible subject matter of ser-
vitudes, and the second concerns the behavior and 
functioning of private residential governments. 
Subject Matter 
There are concerns about some types ofrestrictions. 
While, as described earlier, some courts have stated 
the benefits of servitude arrangements, other courts 
have taken a contrary view.5 This contrary view 
maintains that the law favors the free and unre-
stricted use of land and is suspicious of land use 
restrictions. A covenant is a perpetual restriction. 
Unless specifically limited by the parties at the time 
of creation, a covenant will remain attached to the 
land forever. It will bind not only the original pur-
chaser of the burdened property, but all subsequent 
owners as well. This could be a problem. Current or 
future owners cannot change the use of the land to 
meet the needs of society as reflected in the mar-
ketplace if such changes would result in violation of 
the covenant; thus, efficient use oflimited land sup-
ply may be frustrated.6 One court addressed this 
concern when it stated: "This court has serious res-
ervations about the wisdom of allowing provisions 
contained in a 1949 real estate transaction ... to pre-
vent the development of a substantial piece of real 
estate in 1978" (In re Turners Crossroad Develop-
ment Co. 1979). 
The age old battle of the generations is also a 
relevant concern. Judicial enforcement of a per-
petual covenant created in the past achieves the 
vision of a previous generation, which may thwart 
the aspirations and personal autonomy of the cur-
rent owner. Also, we must take care that in enforc-
ing servitudes to achieve communal goals, we do not 
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intrude into the family home, which we have long 
valued as a private refuge from the larger world. 7 
Therefore, the law must balance the costs and 
benefits of servitudes. I would support the enforce-
ment of a restriction only to the extent that it regu-
lates an owner's external behavior rather than her 
status or private conduct. Courts should thus up-
hold restrictions that control harmful spillovers on 
the community that arise from an owner's use of 
her property (such as noise or traffic). Courts should 
not, however, enforce controls on personal choices 
within a home. Returning to the earlier example of 
the two male co-owners, a court should not enforce 
the covenant to bar them, as they create no greater 
noise, traffic, or other fallout on the neighborhood 
as compared to a "traditional" family. Some courts 
have recognized this distinction where neighbors 
attempted to bar group homes for the physically 
challenged or emotionally disturbed. In one such 
decision, the court noted that "from the outside, the 
home looks like all other single family homes" 
(Costley v. Caromin House, Inc. 1981). This distinc-
tion needs to be adopted by other courts and ap-
plied in other situations. 
Under my test, covenants would be en-
forceable in most every situation. For example, 
aesthetic and architectural covenants would 
be valid, as they control harmful spillovers 
that can harm property values and visual 
ambiance. If a person does not want to be so 
restricted, then he can simply choose not to 
buy in the community. Or if he did buy and 
now does not like the servitudes, then he can 
sell and move out. But he should not be per-
mitted to stay and devalue the scheme for the 
rest of the owners. Only in the unusual case 
where personal autonomy is threatened 
should the court refuse enforcement. 
There is an important reason why courts should 
act when servitudes threaten personal autonomy. 
America has the terrible history of restrictive cov-
enants, once common in this country, that barred 
occupancy by African Americans, other nonwhites, 
and religious minorities (Marsh 1990, 168-170). The 
market mechanism was an insufficient response to 
this assault on personhood---on the contrary, the 
market demanded these covenants. In such cases, 
the law must deny enforcement to the private ar-
rangement and enlightened public policy must pre-
vail.8 
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Regulations on the exhibition ofreligious objects 
and political signs raise complicated issues that are 
not easily resolved. While these restrictions control 
aesthetic intrusions, which we normally allow the 
community to control, they also limit religious and 
political expression and practice. It should be noted 
that public regulations-not just private controls-
often restrict religious and political expression in 
similar ways. 
Association Governance 
The second problem with servitude schemes relates 
to the behavior and functioning of community asso-
ciations. As discussed earlier, community associa-
tions are private governments, and therefore not 
subject to the constitutional limitations and statu-
tory controls that apply to public government deci-
sions and methods of operation. So the question is 
whether private governments should be policed by 
the law and, if so, to what extent. 
Unequal treatment: 
A community association might give unequal treat-
ment to similarly situated owners. For example, 
assume that an association, in response to the 
community's desire for additional recreation areas, 
locates a playground next to a particular owner's 
house, making her the only person in the commu-
nity who has to bear the noise, litter, and other un-
desirable behavior that may arise from the 
playground. 9 
Unequal treatment in the community as-
sociation context is a concern for various rea-
sons. Private communities will be jeopardized 
if homeowner rights can be summarily rear-
ranged by a tyrannical majority. Moreover, 
people have come to expect fair dealing in 
both commercial activities and in public life, and 
they similarly expect equal treatment in the com-
munity association context. 
The courts have begun to address unequal 
treatment. Some decisions have reversed associa-
tion actions that result in unacceptable inequality 
of treatment. Courts have required association de-
cisions to be consistent with the general plan of de-
velopment and the way in which other residents 
have been treated in similar situations (Ridge Park 
Home Owners v. Pena 1975). 
One recent case illustrates this growing attitude 
(Jaskiewicz v. Walton 1988). The covenants govern-
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ing the development barred subdivision of any of 
the lots. The servitudes also permitted amendment 
of the covenants by a majority of the owners. One 
owner wanted to subdivide his lot along the line of a 
ravine that bisected his lot. Twenty-three of forty-
five owners agreed to the amendment of the cov-
enants to permit this one subdivision. The validity 
of the amendment was challenged by some of the 
dissenting owners. The amendment on its face 
seemed to be a reasonable decision since the lot was 
already physically divided, the owner could not build 
a single home across both portions, and amendment 
by a majority of owners was expressly permitted by 
the governing documents. Balanced against this, 
however, was the view that amendments to the cov-
enants should be applied uniformly to all lots, and 
that no special deals should be allowed because of 
the general expectation of equal treatment. More-
over, if ad hoc amendments were possible, one could 
imagine a scenario where fifty-one percent of the 
owners could amend the covenants to release their 
lots from the burden of the restrictions while main-
taining the covenants on the remaining forty-nine 
percent. That would be an unacceptable rewriting 
of the initial bargain upon which all buyers relied. 
The scheme would be destroyed, eroding the expec-
tations of buyers and making servitude communi-
ties less attractive. The court in this case rejected 
the unequal treatment and held that the amend-
ment was invalid. 
A related question is whether the associa-
tion decision-making body exercises its dis-
cretion in a fair manner. One especially difficult area 
involves architectural regulations, since it is diffi-
cult to articulate specific standards. In a recent case, 
the underlying documents required that building 
plans be approved by an architectural control com-
mittee of association members prior to building 
(Smith v. Butler Mountain Estates 1988). The cov-
enant did not provide any standards. An owner sub-
mitted plans for a geodesic dome, and the committee 
rejected them. From the owner's perspective, the ab-
sence of standards makes it difficult for an owner to 
predict how his vision will be treated before he in-
vests in a lot in the subdivision. Moreover, without 
standards, there is a concern that the decision is 
merely. a random event, stifling our social norm of 
free expression. Yet the court, in similar cases, up-
held the decision of the board. Because it is so diffi-
cult to put aesthetic principles into words, and since 
there is no universal agreement as to those prin-
ciples, the board's decision should be upheld as long 
as it is consistent with the neighborhood scheme and 
other board decisions in similar situations. Given 
the clash between the traditional roof lines of the 
other homes and the geodesic dome, the board's de-
cision was legally permissible. 
Procedural fairness: 
Owners also have a right to expect fair procedures 
in association decision making. Courts have imposed 
requirements of notice and an opportunity to be 
heard before the association can take action 
(Hanchett v. East Sunnyside Civic League 1985). 
Courts have also held that decisions must be made 
in good faith and that impermissible biases will not 
be tolerated. The harm to the woman who received 
the "kissing'' notice from her condominium could 
have been averted if she had an opportunity to be 
heard before the association made its summary (and 
incorrect) judgment and imposed its humiliating 
punishment. 
Irrational decisions: 
Some owners may dissent from the wisdom of a par-
ticular decision of the association, such as parking 
rules, pet regulations, and recreational area rules. 
Still, the courts should generally defer to the deci-
sion of the association. A court should not substi-
tute its own determination of the costs and benefits 
of a proposed course of action for the judgment of 
the association. Deference to the association's choice 
is proper since the association has greater exper-
tise and knowledge of the issues, and the decisions 
of the community arrived at through the democratic 
process should be respected. 
However, there is one type of situation, that does 
not often occur, where the court should strike down 
an association decision. This is when the associa-
tion makes a decision that reduces the community's 
welfare by imposing burdens on owners but the de-
cision does not provide any off setting benefits. We 
might describe the association decision in such a 
case as "irrational." 
For example, one case involved a commu-
nity that banned satellite dishes on the theory that 
they were an aesthetic blight (Portola Hills Com-
munity Ass'n v. James 1992). In my view, the court 
correctly permitted an owner to keep his satellite 
dish, despite the regulation, since the layout of the 
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owner's house and his landscaping made it abso-
lutely impossible for anyone else to see the satellite 
dish. Upholding the prohibition against this owner 
would only impose a burden without bringing any 
corresponding aesthetic benefit to the community. 10 
Similarly, another case dealt with a rule that 
permitted only cars to be parked in carports. The 
court held that the rule could not be applied to pre-
vent an owner from parking a noncommercial pickup 
truck that was used only for the owner's transpor-
tation to and from work. The regulation was petty 
and pointless, but very intrusive. The appellate court 
stated: 
Beauty--even with cars-is in the eye of the be-
holder. In this world where those persons con-
cerned with upwardly mobile status frequently 
drive off-road vehicles including well-appointed 
jeeps or pickup trucks, we think the trial court's 
ruling is eminently sensible. The pickup truck, 
often both comfortable and economical, has be-
come for many the equivalent of the convertible 
in earlier years. As times change, cultural per-
ceptions-including society's acceptance of cer-
tain types of vehicles-also change. The pickup 
truck no longer has a pejorative connotation. One 
person's Bronco II is another's Rolls-Royce 
(Bernardo Villas Management Corp. Number 
Two v. Black 1987). 11 
Some people feel that judicial intervention is 
unnecessary in such cases. They argue that the com-
munity could simply change the rule if the commu-
nity agreed that the rule was irrational (Gillette 
1994). This is not convincing, however, since there 
are structural and practical problems that prevent 
the community from addressing all irrational situ-
ations. Inertia and the disinterest of the majority in 
the problems of the few are, unfortunately, power-
ful forces that often prevent a response by the com-
munity. There needs to be some recourse in the case 
of wholly irrational regulation. 
Conclusion 
Private land use controls and community associa-
tions bring great benefits and should be respected 
in virtually all situations. In some special cases, 
though, the public interest requires that the private 
agreement should not be enforced. Although the 
exact dividing line may not always be clear, courts 
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can reach the best results if they base their deci-
sions on a consideration of the underlying policies 
discussed in this article. The law has always been, 
and always should be, evolving, as it responds to 
new developments in society and emerging policy 
concerns. As land policy is rethought and redefined 
to meet the challenges of the future, the law must 
provide a means to implement society's vision of how 
we should utilize our precious and limited land re-
sources. 
NOTES 
1. For further descriptions of these devices: Nollan v. Cali-
fornia Coastal Commission 1987; Degan 1973; Centel 
Cable Television v. Cook 1991; Korngold 1990. 
2. Different legal devices may be used to create a servi-
tude regime and private government-a development may 
be organized as a condominium, with a condominium as-
sociation and the board as a subgroup; or as a tract or 
townhouse development, with a governing body called a 
homeowners or property owners association; or as a coop-
erative, usually organized as a corporation with a board 
of directors. Despite different legal forms, the policy con-
siderations are the same; and since good legal analysis 
does not favor form over substance, the technical differ-
ences in structure should not yield different results. These 
various legal devices are described in Natelson 1989. The 
figures from 1990 indicate that of the total associations 
42% were in condominiums, 7% were in cooperatives, and 
51% were in planned community homeowners associa-
tions. Community Associations Institute 1993, 13. 
3. For documentation of these events see Linn Valley Lakes 
Property Ass'n v. Brockway 1992 (sign); Gerber v. Longboat 
Harbor North Condominium, Inc. 1989 (flag); Earnest 
1991 (swingsets); Brooks 1988 (holiday decorations); 
Higgins 1990 (succah); Nahrstedt v. Lakeside Village Con-
dominium Ass'n 1994 (pet restriction). 
4. Discrimination against sales of homes to fami-
lies with children in now unlawful under the fed-
eral Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3601, unless ex-
empt housing for older persons is involved. See Massaro 
v. Mainlands Civic Ass'n, 3 F.3d 1472 (11th Cir. 1993). 
5. For example, Blevins v. Barry-Lawrence County Ass'n 
for Retarded Citizens, 707 S.W.2d 407 (Mo. 1986). 
6. In Ervin v. Deloney Construction, Inc., 596 So. 2d 593 
(Ala. 1992) the court used its power to interpret a cov-
enant to avoid a restriction that would greatly reduce the 
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land's development. The court held that a small encroach-
ment of a swimming pool on a neighbor's lot was not a 
"structure" that would bar neighbor from building a house 
on the property since that would render the neighbor's 
lot useless. 
7. See Gordon 1978, 66-68 and Clark 1986, xi-xvi, 
discussing American family home as place of ref-
uge. 
8. Racial covenants were voided by an expansive use of 
state action doctrine on constitutional grounds. See 
Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948). 
9. See Killearn Lakes Homeowners Ass'n v. Sneller, 418 
So. 2d 1214 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982). 
10. See Brock v. Strole, 63 Ohio App. 3d 96, 577 N.E.2d 
1168 (1989) (underground culvert not an impermissible 
"structure"). 
11. See also Justice Court Mutual Housing Cooperative, 
Inc. v. Sandow, 50 Misc. 2d 541, 270 N.Y.S.2d 829 (1966) 
(rule limiting the playing of musical instruments by any 
individual to one and one-half hours a day was drawn too 
roughly to address legitimate noise problems and merely 
put a burden on the owners). 
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